The Iran War: How's It Going?

We are 30 days into the Iran War, and according to pundits on the left and right, it is already an utter disaster. Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz. Oil and gas markets are reeling. Israel and the United States are supposedly running out of missiles. Iran is still firing drones and ballistic missiles. Now the Houthis are joining in. The war, we are told, is already spiraling out of control.

Maybe. But after only 30 days, that verdict is far too confident.

And then there is Trump's rhetoric. Critics point to his shifting language and changing metrics as evidence that the war itself is confused or already failing. I am less persuaded. Trump has always been hyperbolic, erratic, and imprecise in his public language. That was true long before this war. His words may muddy the picture, but they are not the war itself.

Presidents do not fight wars personally, and they do not conduct them tweet by tweet or soundbite by soundbite. The real questions are what the military objectives are, what capabilities are being degraded, and whether the campaign is unfolding according to long-prepared plans.

As I mentioned in a previous post, if you are 50 or so, this is the war you knew your whole life would come. However haphazard or sudden it may appear, the United States has had plans for a war with Iran for decades, and those plans were surely updated constantly as conditions changed.

I am not being conspiratorial. I am talking about basic statecraft. Iran has been belligerent toward the United States, Israel, and its neighbors for decades, and its belligerency has only intensified over time. The Pentagon, of course, would prepare for that. It would be irresponsible not to.

And don't think for a second that Iran has not done the same. Friendship Games captures this nicely, I think. Iran's immediate response to the February 28 airstrikes—hitting a broad range of targets across the region—looked very much like the execution of plans prepared well in advance.

It bears repeating that it has only been 30 days. It is clear that Israel and the United States had decided that now is the time to strike against Iran and eliminate as much of its nuclear program as possible from the air.

Why now? Because Israel degraded Iran's air defenses in late 2024 to the point that Iranian airspace was left dangerously exposed. That created a window of opportunity for Israel and the United States to strike Iran's nuclear program—one they might never get again. Once Iran develops a nuclear weapon, any war with Iran would be extremely risky with the possibility—if not likelihood—of the conflict going nuclear. So, now was the time.

Iran still had an opportunity to abandon its nuclear ambitions. During several months of negotiations, however, it was evident that Iran had no intention of shutting down its nuclear program. So, America and Israel struck.

The opening attack decapitated the government of Iran. Its command-and-control structure was heavily degraded. Iran has struck back—and continues to—but that wasn't unexpected. Iran has even managed to close the Strait of Hormuz, a move that likely every war scenario assumed would happen.

The closing of the strait was likely unpreventable and surely not unexpected, never mind whatever words spill out of Trump's head or the heads of his sycophant cabinet. The global economy will surely take a hit, and yes, gas prices will spike. That is a heavy burden, but still preferable to the alternative of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Aside from its nuclear program, Iran has an active missile and drone program. It is making strides in developing longer and longer-range missiles and, like North Korea, is likely at some point to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that can reach the United States mainland. Its drone capabilities, meanwhile, have been on full display in the Ukraine War where Iran has been supplying Shahed drones to Russia for use against Ukraine. Now they have become prominent in the Persian Gulf region as Iran has struck against its neighbors in an attempt to widen the war.

These missiles and drones are likewise a major component of the war and represent the second suite of targeting for the US and Israel. These programs were not part of the nuclear agreement between the US, Iran, and other states, in 2016—and Iran refused to discuss them in any negotiations. These are also the primary weapons Iran is using in the field against Israel and the US, and against its neighboring states as it seeks to widen the war.

The continuing air strikes by the US and Israel undoubtedly include missile and drone manufacturing facilities, and likely the facilities of their supply chains as well. The campaign against Iran's nuclear, missile and drone programs is continuing apace, but it will take time to seek out and destroy transport erector launchers—the platforms for launching ballistic missiles. It will also take time to assess the efficacy of previous and current attacks.

The Washington Post reported this weekend that independent experts believe Iran's missile capabilities are being seriously degraded. Yes, Iran is still firing missiles and will likely continue to for some time. But a country can still lash out even while losing the capacity to sustain war at scale. With its air defenses badly degraded and its missile infrastructure under constant attack, Iran's ability to keep launching large volleys indefinitely is almost certainly shrinking.

To call the war a disaster after just 30 days is nonsense.

Mark James is the Kirkus-starred author of Iran War geopolitical thrillers Friendship Games and The Compass Room. He has taught political and economic geography for over twenty years.