The Iran War: The American Side

News pundits almost universally seem to think that the Iran War – like the Iraq War in the early 2000s – is an illegal war of choice on the part of America.

I might be in the minority on this, but I don't see it that way.

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I may have some ingrained biases, but I always try to be aware of them and critically reevaluate what position I seem to find myself taking. Being in the minority on an issue might also give me pause. Could I be so wrong while a majority of people get it right? Well, yeah. Absolutely. And with that caveat, I will proceed.

Unlike Iraq in 2002-03, there is substantial evidence, recognized by multiple governments and international bodies, that Iran has been working to build a nuclear weapons capability. Given Iran's culpability in terrorism throughout the Middle East and beyond through the years, its theocratic authoritarian ideology, its dedication to the destruction of Israel, and its fundamental opposition to the West, the idea of an Islamic Republic armed with nuclear weapons is intolerable. It is reasonable to fear that a fanatical regime's threshold for nuclear use is lower than that of modern secular states, including the possibility of nuclear terrorism – a danger that analysts such as George Friedman have explicitly raised in light of 9/11. So, it is in the United States' – and much of the world's – interest to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Going to war, though, is inherently dangerous for obvious reasons. It is best to avoid war, and the United States, Israel, and Iran had done exactly that for 45 years. But Iran, for whatever reason, felt emboldened and openly attacked Israel directly in a significant barrage of missiles and drones on April 13-14, 2024. The two countries have been engaged in intermittent combat since.

Given Israel's small size, a single nuclear bomb would threaten Israel's very existence. In the midst of a regional war triggered by Hamas's October 7 terrorist attack, Israel was then openly attacked by a fanatical theocratic regime in Iran, one committed to Israel's destruction and likely on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability (https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iaea-report-says-iran-had-secret-activities-with-undeclared-nuclear-material-2025-05-31/).

Israel struck back hard. So hard, in fact, that Iran's air defenses were knocked out, leaving its airspace undefended for the first time in decades. If there was ever a time to target Iran's nuclear program, it was now or never.

Let's not forget that Iran has agency here. Tehran understood its sudden predicament: undefended airspace amid a war with Israel and growing tensions with the United States. Tehran could see where this was heading: the United States was now likely to demand that Tehran abandon its nuclear program entirely or face its destruction through war.

The jig was up.

Iran reluctantly returned to the negotiation table. There, they made their choice very clear: war. The US and Israel struck on February 28, 2026 with a massive air campaign that killed much of the leadership of the Islamic Republic, including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. But Iran has not rolled over and, in fact, has begun a coordinated campaign of its own: launching missile and drone strikes across the region – at Israel, at American bases, and at US-aligned Gulf states including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Iran is also attacking ships in the Persian Gulf and has closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas supply passes daily, threatening energy markets and the global economy.

America, too, is not without agency here. As mentioned earlier, the Bush 43 and Obama administrations worked diplomatically to tie up Iran's nuclear ambitions via negotiations and economic sanctions. They ultimately led to a multistate nuclear agreement in 2015 between Iran, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. The agreement was comprehensive: Iran agreed to uranium enrichment restrictions, IAEA monitoring of its fuel cycle work, and other, more intrusive, monitoring by the IAEA and other organizations. In exchange, Iran received relief from nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United States, the EU, and the United Nations.

By most accounts, the agreement was working before the first Trump Administration unilaterally withdrew in May 2018 and reimposed sanctions. The administration cited critics who argued that the agreement's sunset clauses only delayed Iran's nuclear progress rather than stopping it. Iran only had to let the clock run out before legally ramping up its program. Critics had other concerns as well, including Iran's support of terrorism, its funding and training of proxies, and its development of ballistic missiles, none of which werepart of the agreement – and which Iran refused to discuss.

Critics of the Trump Administration rightfully point to its unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement as needlessly ramping up tensions with Iran. But it doesn't absolve Iran of its actions.

Critics also focus on the prosecution of the war – and here, I am largely in agreement, at least so far. We are only three weeks into what is likely a very long war. Despite at least two months of deploying air and naval assets to the region prior to the commencement of hostilities, the war seems haphazard. Its prosecution seems designed for a minimal short-term air campaign, not a sustained full-fledged war against what was long regarded as a formidable enemy. Yes, the initial strikes decapitated Iran's government, but the IRGC – the hardline ideological enforcers of the Islamic Republic – is much more dispersed and embedded in society. It even owns companies in oil, transportation, telecommunications, engineering, and other industries. The IRGC's destruction, if that is even possible, will likely take a long time.

Whatever happens, don't expect this war to end cleanly even if the United States declares victory after heavily degrading, if not destroying, Iran's nuclear program and its offensive military capabilities. I can't imagine what an end actually looks like. Just that it will likely melt into a muck of instability that at some point in the future turns into another messy conflict.

Because, in the end, all wars end badly.

Mark James is the Kirkus-starred author of Iran War geopolitical thrillers Friendship Games and The Compass Room. He has taught political and economic geography for over twenty years.